

# Back from the brink

**10 ways the international  
community must address  
Somalia's humanitarian crisis**



TURKISHREDCRESCENT



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# Foreword

## A message from

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In Korsan camp near Mogadishu's international airport, there is no getting away from the human cost of the worst food crisis of the 21st century. A large cluster of tiny graves on the northern side of the camp paints a tragic picture.

Today Korsan is a place of refuge and relative safety for some of the tens of thousands of Somalis drawn to the country's capital at a time when their crops and livestock have been wiped out by East Africa's worst drought for 60 years. But in the early months of the crisis the loss of life in camps like this one was horrific. The dry, parched earth of Korsan became a burial ground for countless children too weak to overcome severe malnutrition and disease.

This report tells the stories of four families in the camp – stories of heart-breaking loss and extraordinary resilience in the face of adversity. It also places those stories in a wider context and attempts to unravel the complex web of factors that precipitated the crisis and turned drought into devastating famine. The key question that needs to be asked is why more aid has not reached those parts of south and central Somalia that have been worst hit by the crisis, the areas that need assistance most.

Our report draws on the experience of four organisations that have been at the heart of the humanitarian response to Somalia's crisis. We do not claim to have all the answers, but we firmly believe that the international community is falling short of what the people of Somalia deserve – to see humanitarian aid delivered to all those who need it in a timely, effective, sustained and impartial way. We hope that aid donors will want to listen to our concerns, and work with us to address them.

Mercifully, the worst of the crisis appears to have passed. On February 3 the United Nations downgraded its assessment of the situation from level 5 (famine) to level 4 (humanitarian emergency). A lot of aid has been successfully delivered – through a combination of governments, multinational bodies, non-government organisations and local aid agencies.

But 2.3 million people remain reliant on food aid to survive. They represent nearly a third of the country's population, still living in crisis. Their survival remains on a knife edge, and we want to ensure that they are not forgotten in the eagerness of the international community to get to grips with the twin threats of piracy and terrorism.

We see a real danger that humanitarian needs will be sidelined if the international community allows its political and security concerns to take precedence over the humanitarian imperative to save lives and rebuild livelihoods. There is also a risk of the conflict in Somalia escalating, further restricting access for aid agencies and preventing people from returning home.

Now is the time to ensure that Somalia's humanitarian needs are at the very top of the international agenda.

# Executive summary

The extreme drought affecting parts of East Africa has contributed to the worst humanitarian crisis in Somalia for 20 years and the deaths of tens of thousands of people, over half of whom are children.

Seven months on from the declaration of the first famine of the 21st century, this report considers some of the lessons to be learned and sets out the urgent action that the international community needs to take to prioritise saving lives and rebuilding livelihoods in Somalia. It has been jointly prepared by four international organisations closely involved in delivering or coordinating humanitarian aid in Somalia: Islamic Relief, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), The Humanitarian Forum and the Turkish Red Crescent Society.

The report's recommendations set out how the international community can address shortcomings in the delivery of humanitarian aid and help achieve the kind of political progress that is required to achieve long-term peace and prosperity.

A renewal of political will and a redoubling of diplomatic effort are needed to seriously tackle what we see as the four key contributory factors in this crisis:

- drought
- conflict
- inadequacies and inflexibility in aid funding
- severely restricted humanitarian access.

## The scale of the crisis

The number of Somalis living in crisis conditions leapt from 2.4 million at the beginning of 2011 to 4 million at the end of the year – more than half the population. Since 1991 the country has suffered between 450,000 and 1.5 million deaths related to conflict and drought. Nearly a million people have been driven out of the country as refugees and 1.5 million more have been internally displaced in this period.

Thousands of people continue to be displaced within Somalia or to seek refuge in neighbouring countries: especially Kenya, where the Dadaab refugee camp has become the biggest in the world.

In mid-December the UN launched its 2012 appeal for Somalia, calling on the international community for \$1.52 billion to support emergency assistance and the rebuilding of lost livelihoods.

## The international response

Despite the evident complexity of the situation, a lot of aid has been successfully delivered and many lives have been saved.

Leading countries in the region and in the Muslim world have been significant contributors to the aid effort; in direct state aid, through the OIC and through private charitable donations. Countries of the OIC pledged over \$350 million in aid, while the UN reports that in November 2011 alone it delivered food aid to 1.5 million people.



## A story of survival

Fadumo Haghi (pictured above) is one of the oldest residents of Mogadishu's network of relief camps for the tens of thousands of people driven towards the capital by hunger as the drought took hold. Her limbs are skinny and frail and her face is full of wrinkles but she smiles the toothless smile of a survivor.

'I was about to die on the walk to Afgooye,' she says from the corner of her family's sturdily built makeshift tent. 'Now I am alive, thanks to Allah.'

Fadumo Haghi shares the tent with her 45-year-old daughter, Samoy Iman Ali, and her four grandchildren – three teenage boys and an eight-year-old girl.

At the end of 2010 the family were thriving farmers in the village of Barirre in Lower Shabelle. But their crops were decimated by the drought. In August 2011 they abandoned their farm in a desperate search for food and water.

A long day's trek in the hot sun brought them to a camp at Arbiska, in the Afgooye corridor, but the respite was only temporary. There was not enough food to go round, and after a month they moved on again – to Mogadishu.

The family are willing to return home, says Mrs Ali, but they are concerned about their safety because of conflict and they do not have the means to start making a living again.

But the number of people dependent upon food aid has remained worryingly high. It is clear from research we conducted in December that the vast majority of displaced people living in relief camps would return home tomorrow if they felt it were safe to do so and if they could be sure of support from aid agencies to restock their herds and plant crops. Without a reversal in the recent escalation of military activity, however, and without increased support from the international community to finance livelihood programmes, most people are likely to stay in these camps and remain dependent upon food aid through much of 2012.

## Our recommendations

We have ten recommendations for how the international community can better address humanitarian needs:

### 1. Scale up diplomatic efforts to ensure full humanitarian access to all those in need

The two main constraints hampering access are the insecurity caused by escalating conflict and the restrictions placed on the work of some aid agencies. The international community, supported by the OIC and the Arab League and other regional bodies, must significantly increase its efforts to engage diplomatically with all parties to the conflict to improve humanitarian access to those in need.

### 2. Prioritise a Somali-led negotiated solution to the conflict over further military escalation, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid

The recent escalation in military activity has caused people to flee their homes and hampered the humanitarian aid effort. Governments and other bodies with influence over the parties to the conflict should press for a ceasefire and a restriction of military activity on all sides to ensure humanitarian needs can be addressed.

### 3. End the politicisation of aid, and ensure that the impartial delivery of aid is given priority over security considerations

Political agendas should not take precedence over humanitarian action. Instead of imposed solutions based on the policy priorities of external actors, the Somali people need a strategy that allows an effective humanitarian response and creates the space for Somalis to resolve their own problems.

### 4. Revise national anti-terror legislation that restricts humanitarian aid, particularly to populations residing in territories controlled by only one side of the conflict

Legislation designed to counter inadvertent support for terrorists has severely restricted donations to some aid agencies and hampered their operations in some of the areas of greatest need in Somalia. All donor governments need to provide clear legal assurance that agencies delivering life-saving aid in Somalia will not face future prosecution in the event of unintentional misappropriation of aid.

### 5. Provide sufficient and timely aid

The impact of the drought in 2011 was considerably worsened by the ineffectiveness of aid funding over a long period up to that point. The UN's 2012 appeal and those of other aid organisations with access beyond Mogadishu must be met with speedy, generous pledges by all donors. The UN's Central Emergency Response Fund should be significantly beefed up.

### 6. Focus aid on the areas of greatest need

A large percentage of aid has been concentrated in Mogadishu, while less has been allocated to rural areas with massive needs. Organisations with access to the areas most badly affected need more support – including a building up of the capacity of local Somali agencies.

### 7. Improve protection and support for refugees and displaced people

Host countries that are signatories to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention must respect the right of those fleeing Somalia to seek asylum by ensuring that people can continue to cross borders. They should not engage in refoulement (forced return of refugees). Refugee registration at Dadaab should be resumed, and protection for women in the camps should be improved.

### 8. Improve early warning to ensure early action in future

The international community was slow in responding to warnings of an impending food crisis in East Africa, and only two out of five of the main early warning systems accurately predicted the crisis at least six months before the declaration of famine. Early warning systems must be improved, and donors and UN agencies should review how they respond to crisis warnings.

### 9. Invest more in recovery initiatives, disaster risk reduction and long-term solutions

Aid donors are funding few capacity-building and risk prevention initiatives in Somalia and investing little in long-term programmes to reduce dependency on aid. Much more needs to be spent on livelihood programmes; disaster risk reduction; smallholder farming and pastoralism; climate change adaptation; building the capacity of small Somali NGOs; and innovative approaches such as drought cycle management and rain water harvesting.

### 10. Adopt an inclusive approach to conflict resolution that ensures that everybody in Somalia, including those previously marginalised, is heard in the peace process

We believe that comprehensive, broad-based conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives provide the basis for sustainable peace building in Somalia, and that efforts at state building should emanate from such processes. The international community, backed by the OIC and Arab League and other regional bodies, must support and facilitate a broad-based, Somali-led reconciliation and political process aimed at arriving at a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the country's conflict.



## The boy with no name

**On the north side of Korsan camp is a painful reminder of what Somalia's humanitarian crisis has cost the families hardest hit. Many children are buried here, in simple graves alongside the temporary shelters that provide warmth at night and shade during the day.**

**'I was sick and my baby died because he was also sick when he was born,' says 28-year-old Aisha Barsane Mohamed (pictured above). 'Now he is buried in this camp.'**

**It was in June 2011 that Mrs Mohamed and her husband left their home village of Basra in Lower Shabelle, accompanied by their three malnourished children aged between eight and 13.**

**Heavily pregnant when she arrived in Mogadishu, Mrs Mohamed gave birth in the camp but her baby son lived for only two weeks, weakened by the malnutrition that has claimed so many lives. Her loss was so swift that the tiny boy had not even been given a name when he died.**

**She remembers how painfully thin she and her children were when they arrived in the camp. They look a lot healthier now, gaining weight and strength from the food aid distributed regularly.**

# Introduction

The extreme drought affecting parts of East Africa has contributed to the worst humanitarian crisis in Somalia for 20 years and the deaths of tens of thousands of people, over half of whom are children

## Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world

Over 40% of people live on less than \$1 a day<sup>1</sup>

Fewer than 20% of the country's 7.5 million people have access to clean water<sup>2</sup>

More than one in five children (225 in every thousand) die before they reach their fifth birthday<sup>3</sup>

Primary school enrolment is just 36% for boys and 24% for girls<sup>4</sup>

At present 2.34 million people – nearly a third of the population – remain in crisis, unable to meet essential food and non-food needs. In what has been the biggest food crisis of the 21st century, Mogadishu is now out of famine but mortality rates remain at the famine threshold of two deaths per 10,000 people per day.<sup>5</sup>

This report sets out the urgent action that the international community needs to take to prioritise saving lives and rebuilding livelihoods in Somalia. The organisations that have collaborated in producing the report believe that a fundamental change of approach is required to cut through the web of political, military and security agendas that continue to hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.


Seven months on from the UN's declaration of famine in parts of Somalia (20 July 2011), we summarise humanitarian needs and place them in a wider context that is too often misunderstood or mishandled. Drought is one cause of the current crisis but man-made factors have exacerbated it. These include not only the country's long-running conflict but also aspects of the international response to that conflict and serious flaws in the delivery of aid.

Among the key factors exacerbating the crisis is a collective failure by all parties to the conflict in working towards and supporting unimpeded humanitarian access to those most in need.

This report has been jointly prepared to communicate the perspective of Islamic Relief, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), The Humanitarian Forum and the Turkish Red Crescent Society. We are a group of international aid agencies that between us have been in the forefront of the western and Muslim worlds' responses to Somalia's food crisis and in the delivery of aid under the coordination umbrellas of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the OIC. Some of us speak from the distinctive perspective of having been very actively involved in delivering aid both in Transitional Federal Government-controlled territory and in areas controlled by armed opposition groups. Others have been involved in improving connections between humanitarian communities.

We implore all parties to the conflict and the international community to put the humanitarian needs of those that are most vulnerable before politics in Somalia's hour of greatest need. Our report suggests ten key areas in which a change of approach would allow this to happen.

The recommendations of our report set out how the international community can better address immediate humanitarian need and how it can help achieve the kind of political progress that is required to achieve long-term peace and prosperity.



# The scale of the crisis

‘Even as aid organisations scale up operations further, the humanitarian situation is expected to worsen and the crisis to continue well into 2012’

UN appeal for Somalia 2012<sup>6</sup>

Number of people in need of aid  
**2.3 million (31% of the population)**

Child malnutrition  
**325,000 acute cases**

Internally displaced people  
**1.4 million**

Somalis living as refugees  
in neighbouring states  
**900,000**

Sources: UN, Somalia Situation Report, no. 34, 8 February 2012  
and Consolidated Appeal, 8 December 2011

Poor rains in late 2010 and 2011 led to the worst annual crop production in southern Somalia in 17 years and the widespread death of animals critical to many families’ livelihoods. Food prices doubled and this made food unaffordable for the poorest people, bringing malnutrition for millions and starvation for tens of thousands.

The number of Somalis living in crisis conditions leapt from 2.4 million at the beginning of 2011 to 4 million at the end of the year – more than half the population of the country. Three-quarters of those affected were in the south/central area, where 250,000 were considered to be at risk of imminent starvation.<sup>7</sup> A staggering 450,000 children under five – one third of all Somalia’s children in this age group – were acutely malnourished.<sup>8</sup>

According to the UN, famine conditions persisted in three areas – parts of Middle Shabelle region and among displaced people who have taken refuge in Afgoye and the capital, Mogadishu. In mid-December the UN launched its 2012 appeal for Somalia, calling on the international community for \$1.52 billion to support emergency assistance and the rebuilding of lost livelihoods.

## War torn and fragile

Somalia’s humanitarian disaster is occurring in the midst of a long-running conflict between forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and armed opposition groups. Thousands of people continue to be displaced within Somalia or to seek refuge in neighbouring countries: especially Kenya, where the Dadaab refugee camp has become the biggest in the world.

Somalia is among the world’s most war-torn and fragile states. Since 1991 the country has suffered between 450,000 and 1.5 million deaths related to conflict and drought. Nearly a million people have been driven out of the country as refugees and 1.5 million more have been internally displaced in this period.<sup>9</sup>

A whole generation of Somalis have now grown up without seeing a fully functioning government. Their country is characterised by lawlessness and social disintegration, its clan structures fragmented and its economy highly dependent upon humanitarian aid.

The economic costs of conflict have been massive. One recent study notes that the various conflicts in Somalia since 1991 have cost over \$55 billion. Piracy off the Somali coast has cost \$22 billion (mainly due to naval operations, ship re-routing and losses to local economies), while \$13 billion has been spent on humanitarian and development aid and \$7 billion on military and peacekeeping operations.<sup>10</sup>

# The human impact

Only when we listen to the human stories behind the statistics can we begin to understand the human cost of a crisis that is essentially beyond measure

The international community needs constantly to be confronted with the human cost of this crisis to ensure that the humanitarian imperative to save lives and restore livelihoods takes precedence over national political agendas and inflexible security considerations.

In December 2011 Islamic Relief conducted focused group discussions among displaced people living in relief camps in Mogadishu. It wanted to freshly assess humanitarian needs within the camps, as well as to explore what support might be needed in people's areas of origin to help them return home and rebuild their lives.

It also wanted to hear people's stories and perspectives – what they had been through and their thoughts about the future. This report includes the stories of four displaced families living in the Korsan refugee camp, near Mogadishu's international airport.

What is clear from discussions with people living in these camps is that on the whole these displaced communities would return home tomorrow if they felt it were safe to do so and if they could be sure of support from aid agencies to restock their herds and plant crops. Without a reversal in the recent escalation of military activity, however, and without increased support from the international community to finance livelihood programmes, most people are likely to stay in these camps and remain dependent upon food aid through much of 2012.

The environment in which aid agencies are working to support those in need in Somalia is very challenging. In 2011 there were 33 attacks on aid facilities in the country, an increase from 23 such attacks in 2010.<sup>11</sup>

In 2008, 45 aid workers were killed, amounting to two-thirds of all the aid workers killed in the world. Attacks on aid workers have declined since then, from 51 in 2008 to eight in 2010.<sup>12</sup> But aid agencies still need armed escorts in particularly sensitive locations or when hosting visitors, adding the burden of significant security costs to stretched budgets.

Various bureaucratic impediments and restrictions are often placed on the movement of humanitarian goods and staff, and lengthy negotiations with local authorities may be needed to overcome these barriers. These factors can delay the delivery of assistance.

# The international response

A renewal of political will and a redoubling of diplomatic effort are needed to seriously tackle this crisis

Despite the evident complexity of the situation in Somalia, a lot of aid has been successfully delivered – through a combination of governments<sup>13</sup>, multinational bodies, non-government organisations and local aid agencies. Much humanitarian suffering has been alleviated.

Leading countries in the region and in the Muslim world have been significant contributors to the aid effort: in direct state aid, through the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and through private charitable donations. Countries of the OIC – including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait – pledged over \$350 million in aid. Turkey, in addition to monetary support, has shown dynamism by sending hundreds of experts to Somalia and re-establishing its embassy in Mogadishu.<sup>14</sup>

The UN reports that in November 2011 alone it delivered food aid to 1.5 million people. Throughout 2011 it admitted 235,000 children into malnutrition treatment programmes and provided 1.2 million people with access to clean water.<sup>15</sup>

Government support has been supplemented by the ICRC; Red Crescent societies and non-governmental organisations from Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE; and members of the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee, including Islamic Relief. The Somalia diaspora and local non-governmental organisations have also played an important role.

Despite these efforts, the number of people dependent upon food aid has remained worryingly high. Much more needs to be done to reach more people and to help those receiving aid in IDP camps<sup>16</sup> to return to their home areas and rebuild their lives and livelihoods. It is of paramount importance to ensure better coordination and collaboration between aid organisations and their networks, so that they strengthen and complement each other.

A renewal of political will and a redoubling of diplomatic effort are needed to seriously tackle the four key contributory factors in this crisis:

- Drought
- Conflict
- Inadequacies and inflexibility in aid funding
- Severely restricted humanitarian access

We believe there are ten inter-related policy changes that must be urgently implemented by the international community to deal with these factors successfully and alleviate the vast suffering that continues to grip Somalia.

# 10 ways to address the crisis

'The humanitarian response is generally insufficient, ineffective in most sectors, often provided too late, based on inaccurate data and not provided uniformly and impartially to vulnerable populations'

DARA, independent humanitarian impact organisation<sup>17</sup>

## 1

### Scale up diplomatic efforts to ensure full humanitarian access to all those in need

*'The ability to respond to needs will depend on the extent of humanitarian access'*

OCHA, 6 December 2011<sup>18</sup>

Improving access to those affected by the crisis is an urgent need. The two main constraints hampering access are the insecurity caused by escalating conflict across a large area and the local restrictions placed on the work of some aid agencies.

Humanitarian access is also being hindered by national counter-terrorism legislation in certain countries, a factor that is considered in recommendation 4.

Foreign donor governments have not done enough to argue or negotiate for better access,<sup>19</sup> and the international community has shown a conspicuous lack of political will to engage diplomatically with stakeholders to support the removal of impediments to the delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>20</sup>

If Somalia can make significant progress in meeting humanitarian needs and improving well-being, then the country is more likely to move towards lasting peace and stability.

**The international community, supported by the OIC, the Arab League and other regional bodies, must significantly increase its efforts to engage diplomatically with all parties to the conflict to get humanitarian aid to all those in need, especially in central and southern Somalia. This diplomatic effort, driven by the humanitarian imperative to save lives and protect dignity, must take immediate precedence over all other political and security considerations at the national and international level.**

**Governments and other bodies with influence over the parties to the conflict must press for an urgent ceasefire and a de-escalation of military activity on all sides and prioritise the urgent humanitarian needs in Somalia. The international community must be mindful of the real risk of areas previously in famine falling back into famine or remaining in a severe state of emergency in 2012 if humanitarian access is further restricted as a result of expanded military activities.**

**All parties to the conflict must guarantee safe access and protection for humanitarian personnel, relief supplies and the assets of humanitarian organisations operating in Somalia. They should also ensure that humanitarian organisations can independently and impartially reach and provide assistance to those in greatest need.**

The international community must take heed of the call by the Humanitarian Country Team for Somalia (a coordination body of UN humanitarian agencies and international NGOs operating in Somalia) to desist from pursuing further military activity and instead increase dialogue and engage in diplomatic efforts to support the opening up of access (see Appendix).

**All parties to the conflict must guarantee safe access and protection for humanitarian personnel, relief supplies and the assets of humanitarian organisations operating in Somalia. They should also ensure that humanitarian organisations can independently and impartially reach and provide assistance to those in greatest need.**

## 2

### Prioritise a Somali-led negotiated solution to the conflict over further military escalation, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid

*'Humanitarian interventions... have been hampered by the ongoing military operations'*

OCHA, 29 November 2011<sup>21</sup>

In October 2011 the Kenyan government responded to a number of kidnappings and killings of tourists and aid workers by deploying military forces in southern Somalia to counter armed militias. In doing so it invoked article 51 of the UN charter, which stipulates the right to self-defence.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has noted that Kenyan military operations in the Juba region of Somalia have caused people to flee their homes and are hampering the humanitarian aid effort.<sup>22</sup> The UN's Humanitarian Coordinator in Somalia has repeatedly informed donors at recent coordination meetings in Mogadishu that the intervention is having 'adverse effects on humanitarian operations, particularly in famine-affected areas'.<sup>23</sup>

Aid agencies have reported that the intervention has prevented them from delivering aid to thousands of people and that the distribution of crucial seeds and tools for the planting season has been delayed, as have plans for public health and sanitation projects.<sup>24</sup>

**Parties to the conflict and the international community must take heed of the findings and recommendations of the UN's Humanitarian Country Team with regard to how military operations and incidents of violence are adversely affecting humanitarian operations.**

Parties to the conflict and members of the international community must desist from any activity that negatively impacts upon civilians and increases risk to aid workers.

Moreover, and as noted above, governments and other bodies with influence over the parties to the conflict should press for a ceasefire and a restriction of military activity on all sides to ensure humanitarian needs can be addressed.

## 3

### End the politicisation of aid, and ensure that the impartial delivery of aid is given priority over security considerations

*'There is a contradiction in the humanitarian aid system, with the UN leading the humanitarian response and at the same time being a political organisation linked to member states'*

Overseas Development Institute<sup>25</sup>

There is significant tension between the international community's stabilisation and humanitarian goals. With many donor governments providing both military and humanitarian aid, the boundaries between military and humanitarian assistance can become blurred.

The international community has prioritised a strategy of trying to consolidate central government in Mogadishu and investing in counter-terrorism. But we believe that this and other political agendas should not take precedence over humanitarian action.

What is needed is for the international community to support humanitarian bodies and their networks in developing a common framework and ground rules for humanitarian intervention and support, independent from Somalia's central and local power structures and the wider political context, in order to create an environment conducive to the negotiation of humanitarian access and the effective delivery of aid.

Instead of imposed solutions based on the policy priorities of external actors, the Somali people need a strategy that allows an effective humanitarian response and creates the space for Somalis to resolve their own problems (see recommendation 10 for more on inclusive peace building).<sup>26</sup>

Donors should be bound by their commitment to upholding the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, whose values include humanity, neutrality and independence.<sup>27</sup>

The provision of humanitarian aid must be based solely on the needs of the population and guided by humanitarian principles, especially impartiality and independence. All parties should reaffirm the distinction between humanitarian aid and political engagement, and support the impartial delivery of humanitarian aid.

The UN should make a clear and practical distinction between its humanitarian/development and political/military roles. The blurring of this distinction has the potential to increase the security risk both to humanitarian organisations and to others delivering aid.

While establishing this distinction, it is also imperative to broaden the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's mandate so that he is empowered to engage fully with parties to the conflict to negotiate better humanitarian access and outcomes.

## 4

### Revise national anti-terror legislation that restricts humanitarian aid, particularly to populations residing in territories controlled by only one side of the conflict

*'The famine in Somalia represents a collective failure of the international community to uphold one simple principle. This is that humanitarian assistance – the type of assistance that the poorest people need to avert starvation in a drought – should have no political strings attached'*

Sally Healy, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London<sup>28</sup>

In 2009, following the US State Department's designation of the armed opposition group Al Shabaab, the US Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) suspended \$50 million in US aid on grounds that it could benefit terrorists.<sup>29</sup> It did so under the terms of US legislation prohibiting any contact with a terrorist group – legislation that effectively limits US humanitarian assistance to people in areas controlled by US allies.<sup>30</sup> Under the 2009 ruling, US-funded humanitarian organisations found themselves at risk of criminal prosecution where there was the possibility of indirect or inadvertent benefit to proscribed entities as a result of humanitarian activities in territory controlled by proscribed groups.<sup>31</sup>



### Aid under pressure

A review of the global operational impact of counter-terrorism legislation by the Overseas Development Institute found that it has adversely affected humanitarian aid in a number of ways:

- Levels of humanitarian funding have been reduced
- The timeliness and efficiency of humanitarian aid have been reduced
- Relations between humanitarian organisations and local communities have been undermined
- The level of coordination between humanitarian groups has fallen.<sup>32</sup>

In Somalia in particular, aid agencies have been made to spend a lot of time and energy demonstrating compliance with anti-terrorism measures. They have ended up having to slow down their operational responses due to the need to establish vetting and verification systems.<sup>33</sup>

Restrictions imposed by OFAC are reinforced by international rules to counter the financing of terrorism. The way in which these have been applied by banks and individual governments (particularly in the US and some Gulf states) restricts donations to, and spending by, non-governmental organisations. This has diverted aid away from some of the famine areas to areas controlled by the TFG and to neighbouring countries.

In 2009 this contributed to a shortfall in funding that meant that only two-thirds of the \$900 million appeal was raised, according to the UN office in Somalia.<sup>34</sup> An Overseas Development Institute study notes that between 2008 (when the UN passed Resolution 1844 targeting sanctions against listed organisations and individuals) and 2011, humanitarian aid funding to Somalia fell by half – mainly because of a fall in US contributions.<sup>35</sup>

Another important implication of these international rules and the way that they have been implemented is the impact on remittances being sent back by the émigré community in the US through the 'hawala' system of transfers. In December 2011 some institutions that used to handle hawala remittances ceased to do so for fear of prosecution.

**Governments should enable donors and humanitarian organisations to send aid in accountable ways. All donor governments need to provide clear legal assurance that agencies delivering life-saving aid in all areas of Somalia will not face future prosecution in the event of inadvertent or unintentional misappropriation of aid.**

**Governments should revise national anti-terror legislation and regulations to ensure that they do not restrict life-saving humanitarian assistance and access to civilian populations in need of such assistance, wherever they may be. Governments should work with banks and other intermediaries to ensure that they facilitate this.**

Such legislation should also be accompanied by clear and simple guidelines for compliance by humanitarian agencies, in order to minimise delays and bureaucracy in the delivery of aid.

## 5

### Provide sufficient and timely aid

*'We need to expand the Central Emergency Response Fund – which has worked extremely well – and identify additional sources of innovative financing for emergencies'*

Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, January 2012<sup>36</sup>

Aid to Somalia has traditionally been high compared to what other countries receive – over \$9 billion has been directed to the country since 1991.<sup>37</sup> The fact that there is not more to show for this aid is partly due to the failure of security and other policies, but also due to the *inconsistent* pattern in funding.

A total of \$1.26 billion in aid was provided to Somalia in 2011 and the UN's 2011 appeal was relatively well funded: by mid-December more than 80 per cent of the \$1 billion requested had been provided by donors. But much of this aid was only provided after the declaration of famine in July 2011. By then the impact of the drought had been considerably worsened by the inadequacy of aid funding over a long period up to that point.

In 2009 only 64 per cent of the UN appeal for Somalia was funded, compared to 72 per cent in 2008 – a reduction that was largely the result of dramatically reduced US funding.<sup>38</sup> Aid also fell in 2010 by 26 per cent compared to 2009.<sup>39</sup>

From June 2010 to January 2011, the number of people in crisis rose from 2 million to 2.4 million, a 20 per cent jump in six months.<sup>40</sup> Yet during the first half of 2011 humanitarian funding for Somalia was low and came in slowly. The UN notes that inadequate funding 'made it difficult for the humanitarian community to respond to the worsening drought in the country'.<sup>41</sup>

Speedy and flexible delivery of aid is vital in this and other major emergencies. The Central Emergency Response Fund, established in 2006 to provide the UN with a prepositioned pot of money to enable a more timely response to natural disasters and conflicts, has an annual pot of only some \$450 million for all emergencies around the world. This sum is not only insufficient but also insecure, as the fund relies on voluntary contributions rather than mandatory government support.

**The UN's 2012 appeal for Somalia and appeals from other aid organisations with extensive access beyond Mogadishu (see point 6 below) must be met with speedy, generous pledges by all donors. As and when the worst of the food crisis recedes, aid needs to be maintained to provide security in case of future disasters and to help build up the long-term resilience of communities.**

**The Central Emergency Response Fund should be significantly beefed up, and contributions made mandatory and enforceable.**

**A review needs to be undertaken of international funding mechanisms to explore how these need to change to accommodate 'non-traditional' donors.**



# 6

## Focus aid on the areas of greatest need

*'Unless all parties remove the barriers that stand between organisations with the capacity to save lives and the people who rely on them for their survival, thousands more may continue dying preventable deaths'*

Dr Unni Karunakara, Médecins Sans Frontières<sup>42</sup>

The UN's 2012 appeal notes that hitherto a large percentage of aid from donors has been concentrated in Mogadishu, while less has been allocated to rural areas with massive needs, such as the hard-hit Bay and Bakool regions.<sup>43</sup> In recent years a significant proportion of development funds have been directed to the north of Somalia – even though the need has been greater in the south – because it is more straightforward to operate there.<sup>44</sup>

For too long more accessible and less insecure areas have tended to be unduly favoured by some donors. Some agencies that have access to people in the greatest need have been conspicuously under-resourced.

Questions have also been raised about the extent to which funds raised for Somalia are actually being spent in Somalia on Somalians, rather than on aid operations and administration in neighbouring Kenya (where most international NGOs have their regional headquarters).<sup>45</sup> The TFG is planning to conduct an audit of international aid organisations to assess their levels of spending in Somalia.<sup>46</sup>

**Along with massive improvements in humanitarian access, funding needs to be generated for, and made available to, those agencies with access to the areas most badly affected. Such organisations need broader and deeper support to enable them to scale up their humanitarian response – including a building up of the capacity of local Somali agencies so that more aid can be channelled through them. In designing and implementing emergency aid and long-term development projects, there must be more involvement of the beneficiary community, including Somali and diaspora NGOs. It is vital that the local community is involved at all stages from planning to implementation.**

**There should be transparent reporting by all international agencies and bodies of the funds they have raised or received for the East African crisis and how this funding has been allocated and spent across the countries affected. Participatory monitoring and evaluation mechanisms should be used to ensure that aid programmes are fully accountable to their Somali beneficiaries.**

# 7

## Improve early warning to ensure early action in future

*The principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of a refugee to a territory where his or her life or freedom is threatened, is considered a rule of customary international law. As such it is binding on all states, regardless of whether they have acceded to the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol'*

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, September 2011<sup>47</sup>

More than a third of sub-Saharan Africa's refugees are of Somali origin. Their numbers swelled by over a quarter of a million in 2011 as hungry Somalis trekked to Kenya and Ethiopia to escape from the deadly combination of severe drought and conflict. The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, reports that it has registered more than 917,000 Somali refugees in East Africa.<sup>48</sup>

The focal point for the refugee exodus has been the sprawling Dadaab complex of settlements, the world's biggest refugee camp, 80 km from Kenya's north-eastern border with Somalia. Dadaab was originally established for 90,000 people in 1991 but is now home to nearly half a million. In some ways it is a triumph of human resilience in the face of adversity, a vibrant city of refugees with its own infrastructure of schools, health clinics, traders and sanitation. It has been operating for so long that children born there are now having children of their own.

But the camp is also a symbol of failure, its longevity and scale a reminder that for an entire generation the international community has failed to address the state of collapse that continues to afflict much of Somalia.

The priority for aid agencies in a humanitarian emergency should be to provide stability and support for people in their home areas where possible, minimising the kind of mass displacement that can cost so many lives as exhaustion and dehydration take their toll on people already weakened by malnutrition. Delivering life-saving aid to the parts of Somalia hardest hit by the drought has been and will remain the primary focus of the organisations behind this report.

But once people are displaced from their homes or flee the country as refugees, it is the responsibility of host countries and the international community to provide for and protect them adequately.

The international community should engage and support the Kenyan authorities to resume refugee registration at Dadaab. Suspension of registration is having a negative impact on newly arrived refugees, on existing refugees (who are under pressure to share very limited resources with those who are not receiving assistance due to non-registration) and on host communities.

Host countries that are signatories to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention must respect the right of people fleeing Somalia to seek asylum by ensuring that people can continue to cross borders, and not engage in refoulement (forced return of refugees). Forcing Somali refugees back across the border into camps inside Somalia would be a breach of international refugee conventions. Voluntary return, where it is safe and refugees are willing and able, should be supported by the UN mandated agencies and funded by the international community.

The international community must share and support the burden faced by governments in hosting large refugee populations by ensuring necessary financial support.

# 8

## Improve early warning to ensure early action in future

*A La Niña event has been declared based on the cooling of sea surface temperatures (SST) in the central Pacific Ocean. La Niña events are associated with drier-than-normal conditions during the October–December rainy season in the eastern sector of East Africa, and...can also result in poor March–May rains in the eastern sector of the region. The main areas of concern are those that depend on the short rains for crop and pasture production, including Somalia...'*

Famine Early Warning Systems Network, August 2010<sup>49</sup>

Somalia's current crisis should never have developed to the extent it has. The declaration of the 21st century's first famine makes a mockery of early warning systems that are meant to prevent such crises.

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) first forecast worse-than-usual food insecurity in East Africa as early as August 2010 (see quotation above), and its warnings were echoed by the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group from October 2010 and by a chorus of non-government aid agencies in January 2011.<sup>50</sup>

Unfortunately these early warnings did not lead to early action. It took another six months for famine to be declared and for significant amounts of new aid to start flowing.



## From plenty to poverty

Many of those driven from their home villages by the drought are farm owners and cattle herders. Without their cattle they no longer have the means to feed their families.

'You don't have to worry about buying milk for your children while you are busy farming, and that's why we are so dependent on cattle for family life,' explains Mariam Abdi Jeelle, 41, from the village of Bombasa near Qoryoley town in Lower Shabelle region.

Before the drought Mrs Jeelle and her family had plenty of cattle and a large farm irrigated by river water. But successive rains failed, the river dried up and their livestock perished. 'There is no life left there,' she says. Now she lives with her husband and eight children in Korsan camp.

'Here I have rice, oil, sugar and sorghum and we are given medication,' she says. 'Islamic Relief was one of the first aid organisations who came to help us here in this camp and they give us everything. Allah is great.'

For now, this family feel safe and well fed. But only when they are able to buy cattle and farm again do they feel that they will be able to return home.

In an academic review of five early warning systems FEWSNET and FSNWG were the only two that were found to have accurately predicted the food security crisis in East Africa at least six months before the declaration of famine.<sup>51</sup> The other three regional early warning systems did not.<sup>52</sup>

**The international community, and specifically the UN, must improve its early warning systems so that they do indeed provide early warnings. Donors and UN agencies should review how they respond to such early warning systems to ensure that early action is taken every time and that an effective humanitarian response is delivered.**

9

## Invest more in recovery initiatives, disaster risk reduction and long-term solutions

*Hardly any development aid is available for southern and central Somalia'*  
DARA<sup>53</sup>

An analysis of donors' response to humanitarian needs in Somalia by the independent organisation, DARA, found that 'hardly any development aid is available for southern and central Somalia'.<sup>54</sup> Donors are funding few capacity-building and risk prevention initiatives in Somalia and investing little in long-term programmes to reduce dependency on aid, 'preferring to fund the more visible short-term emergency aid'.<sup>55</sup> Donors will finance trucks carrying water tanks, for example, but most fail to repair pipes or deal with water and sanitation problems in a more structured, sustainable way.<sup>56</sup>

In November 2011, 94 per cent of the UN's appeal for funds for emergency food aid had been met by donors but only 66 per cent of the requested agriculture and livelihoods funding had been provided. The story was similar with education and protection programmes, funded only 62 per cent and 17 per cent respectively.<sup>57</sup>

Humanitarian aid accounts for a startling 43 per cent of Somalia's vibrant 'free style' economy, and this inevitably creates dependency on aid. More funding needs to be directed towards programmes that support people in establishing or restoring livelihoods to sustain them in the long term, without the need for ongoing aid.

Recovery programmes need to be developed and implemented alongside relief work. In a country such as Somalia, the standard humanitarian practice of not initiating recovery work until the end of the relief phase is likely to leave communities stranded in a phase of perpetual emergency relief.



## Saved by kitchen scraps

**Amino Abdi Iman, 45, lives with her husband and four surviving children in the Korsan camp in Mogadishu. Her two-year-old daughter, Maryan Mohamed Adan, did not make it to the camp. She died on the family's 12-mile walk to Elasha from their home area of Afgooye, fatally weakened by a combination of measles, malnutrition and diarrhoea.**

**The family were growing maize and sorghum on their farm in Afgooye but left when the drought wiped out their crops. On arrival in Elasha they were helped by the kindness of local people, who collected money to pay for them to travel on to Mogadishu by truck.**

**They found that little food aid was available in the capital and so at first they relied on scraps from a kitchen in Hamarweyne to survive. Now they receive food aid regularly, and the family's health is much improved.**

**Like so many displaced people, Mrs Iman says she and her family would be happy to return home – but only if there is hope and help for starting to farm again.**

There is a particular need, too, to invest in disaster risk reduction and to address the impact of climate change. The UN Secretary General's report on Somalia of August 2011 notes that 'the deforestation and land degradation in southern areas of Somalia have increased exposure and vulnerability to the effects of natural hazards and climate change, such as droughts and floods'.<sup>58</sup>

In recent years the Horn of Africa has seen a marked increase in the frequency and severity of droughts. The Royal Society estimates that much of the region could suffer a 20 per cent decline in the length of the growing period for key crops, and a 50 per cent fall in the productivity of beans, by the end of the century.

Climate change is also likely to make livestock farming more challenging by reducing grassland areas and increasing the incidence of animal diseases.<sup>59</sup> Aid agencies are increasingly developing disaster risk reduction strategies that work in unforgiving dryland areas, helping to address the underlying causes of vulnerability and to put communities in charge of managing their own responses.<sup>60</sup>

**International donors should invest much more in long-term but flexible disaster risk reduction activities and climate change adaptation, as well as in smallholder farming and pastoralism. Drought cycle management approaches, where different activities are pursued at different stages of a drought cycle, need to be more effectively supported by governments and donors in the region, along with innovative water supply and harvesting systems, improved access to markets, and credit programmes.<sup>61</sup>**

**Humanitarian organisations should be supported to provide livelihood support packages to those displaced people who are willing and able to return to their villages, otherwise these communities will need prolonged emergency assistance for the next 9–12 months and possibly longer.**

**As part of this, all international actors need to explicitly recognise and invest in building the capacity of Somali NGOs. Coordination and partnerships between international and national NGOs should be increased.**

**The humanitarian community and its international funders should develop an agreed 'road map' to link relief and recovery interventions coherently and break the cycle of aid dependency.**

10

## Adopt an inclusive approach to conflict resolution that ensures that everybody in Somalia, including those previously marginalised, is heard in the peace process

It is extremely difficult in an unsecured environment to launch and sustain effective humanitarian programmes aimed at recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. The effectiveness of any such humanitarian initiative will depend to a greater or lesser extent on the restoration of peace.

The organisations that have collaborated to produce this report believe that comprehensive, broad-based conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives provide the basis for sustainable peace building in Somalia, and that efforts at state building should emanate from such processes.

These efforts can only succeed if concerted diplomatic efforts are made to engage all sections of Somali society – including elders, minority clans and religious leaders – in genuine dialogue, and if broad-based traditional institutions are allowed to fully participate. Only with such institutions on board will it be possible to step beyond conventional judicial and political processes to address deep-seated enmities and injustices which have resulted in clan-based atrocities, divisions and distrust.

**The international community, supported by the OIC and Arab League and other regional bodies, must support and facilitate a broad-based Somali led reconciliation and political process aimed at arriving at a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the country's long-running conflict. Policies and processes driven by an international security and political agenda will almost certainly not succeed if Somalis themselves are not at peace with one another and if human security is not prioritised.**

**It is only through peaceful resolution of the conflict that Somalia can ensure all its people have a fair stake in its future, enabling the country to emerge from the current humanitarian crisis better placed to mitigate against and respond to the risks of future droughts and other climate-based challenges.**

# Islamic Relief in Somalia

Islamic Relief started operating ad-hoc projects in Somalia in 1996 and has been fully registered since 2006, with five offices throughout the country. These include three in Somaliland and Puntland in the north, one in TFG-controlled Mogadishu in the south and a project office in territory controlled by armed opposition groups in Baidoa, to the north west of the capital.

The Baidoa sub-office is the newest of the five, opened in July 2011 to provide food, water and health care across Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle – three of the areas hardest hit by the current food crisis. Through its offices Islamic Relief is one of the few international aid agencies providing emergency aid on both sides of the country's conflict.

Islamic Relief's work in Somalia began with seasonal Qurbani and Ramadan food distribution 15 years ago and the organisation now has fully fledged year-round relief and development programmes. These include emergency food and water distribution, health care, education and longer-term water, sanitation, livelihoods and disaster-risk-reduction projects.

Islamic Relief has provided life-saving aid to over half a million people in Somalia in the past six months. When it launched its global emergency appeal for East Africa on July 6, it was providing food aid to around 10,000 Somalis. Within a few weeks it had expanded this operation to the point of distributing emergency food packs to 180,000 people each month and trucking water to 120,000 people daily. It has built latrines to help prevent the spread of disease in a number of camps for displaced people, and has financed a unit at Banadir hospital in Mogadishu to ensure that those weakened by severe diarrhoea or cholera get swift life-saving treatment.

In northern Somalia Islamic Relief is piloting 'disaster risk reduction' strategies – approaches that offer hope for communities to be more resilient in the face of future droughts. These include rainwater harvesting and crop nurseries where food grains are being successfully grown for transplanted into the fields as knee-high seedlings – an approach that ensures a better chance of success in the narrow window of opportunity offered by limited rains.

'Disaster risk reduction is something that all aid donors need to encourage because it is an investment in crisis prevention that could save many lives in the years to come,' says Iftikhar Shaheen, Islamic Relief's Regional Director for East Africa and formerly its Country Director for Somalia. 'The Somali community have been dispersed far and wide during the past 20 years of conflict, and in that time they have shown remarkable resilience, resourcefulness and adaptability. With proper support through disaster risk reduction programmes, Somali pastoralists and farmers are highly capable of confronting the challenge of climate change.'

[www.islamic-relief.com/wherewework/9-so-somalia.aspx](http://www.islamic-relief.com/wherewework/9-so-somalia.aspx)

# The Humanitarian Forum and Somalia

The Humanitarian Forum is a global network of key humanitarian and development organisations from Muslim donor and recipient countries, the west and the multilateral aid and development community. It works to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid by addressing identified gaps between humanitarian communities. It empowers civil society groups at all levels through training and connections, working internationally and in partner countries such as Indonesia, Libya, Somalia and Yemen.

The Humanitarian Forum's work in relation to Somalia started in October 2009. The roundtable it organised provided a timely and neutral space for humanitarian organisations from the west, the Gulf, Turkey and Somalia to discuss Somalia's needs, and there was general agreement that local Somali organisations should play a vital part. Dr Hany el Banna, President of The Humanitarian Forum, continued this engagement with visits to Mogadishu and Dadaab to assess needs and build links between organisations.

The need to further improve coordination and cooperation between the different humanitarian communities prompted The Humanitarian Forum to convene stakeholder conferences in Nairobi in August and October 2011, the first one within weeks of the UN declaring famine in the region. The discussions focused around key humanitarian issues and brought together a wide range of organisations from all communities. The participants felt there was a large gap between needs and delivery, and agreed that a long-term vision needs to be found regarding the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

Coordination between the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was considered a priority, with longer-term recovery a crucial step in the development of the region. The acting UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Rozanne Chorlton, said the series of conferences was "extremely important, exactly what needs to happen. Focus on progress through partnership, rather than competition."

The Humanitarian Forum has supported Somali civil society organisations, both in Somalia itself and the diaspora. In early 2011 it helped to create the Somali Relief and Development Forum (SRDF), a network of UK-based NGOs operating in and with Somalia, together with its partner the Muslim Charities Forum. This brought these organisations together for the first time and created a space for dialogue among them. The shared vision that has come out of the Forum's early meetings is that the perception of Somalia as a failed state can be reversed through partnerships between the organisations involved in the SRDF and with local communities and the government.

In Somalia the Humanitarian Forum is helping to develop a national forum of local NGOs that represents the diversity of the country, allows robust dialogue about humanitarian and development priorities, and can play a lasting role in developing a community of effective local aid and development agencies. The new forum that has been established, the Somali Humanitarian Operational Consortium (SHOC), is a coalition of Somali local NGOs working mainly in South and Central Somalia. It is Somalia's only network of national NGOs (there are some thematic groups, but these have a different function).

[www.humanitarianforum.org](http://www.humanitarianforum.org)

[www.srdf.org.uk](http://www.srdf.org.uk)

[www.facebook.com/pages/somali-humanitarian-operational-consortium-shoc/227087304044432?v=info](https://www.facebook.com/pages/somali-humanitarian-operational-consortium-shoc/227087304044432?v=info)

# Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Somalia

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), established in 1969, is the second-largest inter-governmental organisation after the United Nations. With a membership of 57 states spread over four continents, the OIC provides a collective voice for the Muslim world. It seeks to safeguard and protect the interests of Muslim countries while engaging on their behalf to promote peace and international cooperation.

In March 2011 the OIC established its Humanitarian Coordination Office (HCO) for Somalia in Mogadishu, which now employs 22 staff. The role of the HCO is to relieve human suffering in Somalia and develop recovery and rehabilitation programmes on behalf of a coalition of 38 members. It works to ensure that humanitarian work involving its member countries and their organisations is well coordinated, facilitating action to reach the most needy areas and filling any gaps in provision it identifies. It also raises awareness about the humanitarian work of Islamic NGOs, and helps them to build their operational capacity and train their staff.

The OIC's activities and accomplishments in Somalia to date have included:

- **Field assessments**

The OIC conducts regular field assessments to gauge humanitarian needs, in order to mobilise resources from OIC member states and deliver a coordinated response with and through its coalition members.

- **Fundraising**

The OIC has helped to secure pledges totalling \$350 million for emergency relief in Somalia from OIC member countries, by briefing donors and their agencies on the crisis as it has developed.

- **Coalition building**

In response to the current crisis in Somalia, the OIC formed a coalition of 38 Muslim national and international NGOs. This coalition coordinates humanitarian operations in six areas, with a lead agency for each: food; health; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); camp management; information and communication; and education and training.

- **Food aid distribution**

The OIC office in Somalia has coordinated and facilitated the distribution of approximately 85,000 tonnes of food from donor countries, 30% in Mogadishu and the rest of it outside the city. Over a million vulnerable people have benefited.

- **Health interventions**

The OIC has provided effective coordination for the health programmes of its coalition members, which are mainly focused on IDP camps in Mogadishu. The facilities and support provided have included medical supplies, an effective referral system, treatment centres and mobile clinics. Around 550,000 have benefited from these services.

- **Other coordination activities**

The OIC's Humanitarian Coordination Office in Somalia is a hub of communication, collaboration and information sharing for its own coalition members. It also liaises closely with other NGOs and the relevant institutions of the Transitional Federal Government and the United Nations. The OIC's coordination activities have included:

- Developing a 'road map' for post-emergency recovery programmes through a conference in September that brought together representatives of 75 local, international and multilateral humanitarian agencies
- Building on that road map by working with its coalition partners on developing livelihood and economic recovery programmes; water and sanitation programmes; primary health care projects; and programmes for disaster preparedness and mitigation
- Organising a conference in Cairo in October 2011 and a follow-up event in Djibouti in January 2012 to help develop and deliver post-emergency water projects in Somalia. The Cairo event mobilised \$82 million in support from OIC member countries – enough for 673 boreholes to be drilled in 18 regions of Somalia.

For news updates and information on how to donate to the work of the OIC in Somalia visit [www.oic-oci.org/external\\_web/somalia2011/en/](http://www.oic-oci.org/external_web/somalia2011/en/)

# Turkish Red Crescent in Somalia

The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has been present in Somalia implementing relief activities through a coordination office in Mogadishu since August 7 2011. After a short assessment period, the TRC initiated emergency distributions of food and other essentials to internally displaced people (IDPs) affected by the famine.

The TRC team is composed of nine expatriates and 146 local staff. It has worked in close cooperation with the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) under the umbrella of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement from the very beginning of its humanitarian response in the country.

So far 11 TRC relief consignments totalling 5.8 million kg have arrived in Somalia by air and sea. The TRC is distributing food parcels designed to meet the nutritional needs of a family of six people for up to a month. In addition foods such as flour, pasta, rice and vegetable oil have been distributed in the Banadir, Lower Shabelle and Hiraa regions. In total 4.2 million kg of relief materials have been distributed to 681,940 individuals up to 5 February 2012.

The TRC set up 2,000 tents for IDPs at a camp in the Jazira neighbourhood of Wadajir district in Mogadishu. That camp currently accommodates 12,000 IDPs whose main places of origin are the Bay and Bakool regions of Somalia. Between late 2011 and early February a TRC mobile bakery produced 300,000 loaves of bread and distributed them to IDPs. Basic healthcare services and clean water are being provided by partner organisations, while the TRC has contributed a laundry, 108 latrines and 50 showers. It has also distributed qurbani meat to 35,550 households in Mogadishu and around Afgooye.

The TRC plans to establish a concrete plant and to support a public works department in Mogadishu. The idea is to rebuild the city's infrastructure including rubbish collection and disposal works, road construction and the rehabilitation of public buildings.

Following assessments conducted by the TRC team in Somalia, the restoration and reconstruction of health facilities and the training of medical personnel have been identified as priority areas. To assist with this a Vocational School of Medical Sciences and Nursing will be constructed.

The TRC aims to support the SRCS with organisational development through improved operational capacity and the physical rehabilitation of Red Crescent premises.

Livelihood programmes will also be implemented by the TRC in an attempt to reduce poverty and strengthen the resilience of the Somali community. These programmes will offer skills training in areas such as farming, livestock breeding, carpentry, tailoring and fishing.

- **Donations**

Donations in support of Turkish Red Crescent activities may be made in US dollars via its bank account as follows:

Bank: TC Ziraat Bankasi  
Branch Code: 685  
Swift Code: TCZBTR2A  
Account No: 2868-5006  
IBAN: TR97 0001 0006 8500 0028 6850 06

Online donations:  
<http://secure.kizilay.org.tr/nakdibagis.aspx?kodu=3>

# Appendix

HCT Position Paper, 2 December 2011. Drafted: OCHA Somalia  
Military intervention in support of humanitarian action in Somalia

To date, roughly 4 million people are affected, 3.3 million of whom are in need of immediate life-saving assistance. Famine still exists in three areas of Somalia (parts of Middle Shabelle, the Afgooye Corridor area, and IDPs in Mogadishu).

The severity of the crisis has prompted some states to suggest that military intervention should be used to support humanitarian action; arguing that this would allow the humanitarian community to access populations in need. A number of possible options have been suggested, including using military forces from neighbouring states, AMISOM taking on this responsibility or that a full-fledged UN-led peacekeeping mission, either jointly or in lieu of the AMISOM forces, be used.

The use of military action remains a great concern to the humanitarian community operating in Somalia. The use of military intervention to support humanitarian action directly impacts the population because it risks intensifying or expanding the conflict; thereby, contributing to further displacement and civilian deaths.

Humanitarian access should not be used as a pretext for military interventions. All parties to the conflict should understand the importance of not justifying military and political operations in the name of humanitarian assistance. The misuse of the label 'humanitarian' by actors representing military or political interests undermines legitimate humanitarian operations and the independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors. A perception that humanitarian actors are linked to political and/or military agendas directly endangers humanitarian access, staff and supplies. New or expanded military intervention into famine areas not only impacts negatively on populations but also will compromise humanitarian operations for the following reasons:

- Previous foreign military interventions did not increase humanitarian access but rather polarised opinions; led to a deterioration of the operating environment; and resulted in increased challenges for humanitarian agencies
- New or expanded military interventions, by definition, will have to increase conflict and further diminish humanitarian access
- New or expanded military interventions under the guise of supporting humanitarian efforts are contrary to the principles of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian organisations and will jeopardise existing humanitarian activities.

In light of this analysis, the HCT is of the strong view that new or expanded military interventions to support humanitarian action will not improve the lives of those most in need and will decrease the humanitarian community's ability to access populations in urgent need of assistance.

As fighting expands in Somalia to multiple fronts and with multiple actors, it is critical that the international community exerts pressure on all actors to respect their obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian deaths and injuries.

The HCT believes that the solution to access populations in need is in increased dialogue. Rather than military options, the international community should identify and seek out interlocutors to negotiate with all actors in control of territory, with the sole aim to increase humanitarian assistance to populations in need.

# Endnotes

- 1 UN, *Somalia 2012 Consolidated Appeal*, 8 December 2011, p.6
- 2 *ibid*
- 3 John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, *Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Costs of Failure in Somalia*, September 2011, p.13
- 4 *ibid*
- 5 UN, *Somalia Situation Report*, No. 34, 8 February 2012
- 6 UN, *Somalia 2012 Consolidated Appeal*, 8 December 2011, p.1
- 7 OCHA, *Somalia Situation Report*, No.25, 6 December 2011, p.1; OCHA, *Humanitarian Dashboard Somalia*, October 2011
- 8 *ibid*
- 9 John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, *Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Costs of Failure in Somalia*, September 2011, p.1
- 10 *ibid*
- 11 UN, *Somalia 2012 Consolidated Appeal*, 8 December 2011, p.16
- 12 Mark Bradbury, *State Building, Counterterrorism and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia*, Briefing Paper, Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, September 2010, pp.2, 9; Humanitarian Outcomes, *Aid Worker Security Report 2011*, p.5
- 13 [www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/aug/01/drought-food-crisis-africa-data](http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/aug/01/drought-food-crisis-africa-data).
- 14 The Turkish Ambassador to Somalia is an aid worker himself and was previously Chief Executive Officer of Doctors WorldWide, a non-government organisation based in the UK.
- 15 OCHA, *Somalia Situation Report*, No.25, 6 December 2011; OCHA, *Horn of Africa Crisis Situation Report*, No.26, 9 December 2011
- 16 Camps for internally displaced people, or IDPs.
- 17 DARA, *Humanitarian Response Index 2011*, p.212
- 18 OCHA, *Somalia Situation Report*, No.25, 6 December 2011, p.3
- 19 DARA, *Humanitarian Response Index 2011*, p.218
- 20 Ken Menkhaus, 'A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine', September 2011, p.1 ([www.enough.org](http://www.enough.org))
- 21 OCHA, *Somalia Situation Report*, No.25, 29 November 2011, p.1
- 22 *ibid*
- 23 The Humanitarian Coordinator is reported as adding: 'There is the possibility of increased displacement into Mogadishu from Afgooye and to the Ethiopian border putting further pressure on the existing overcrowded IDP settlements, and reduced access with disruptions in cross-border supply routes and in areas where humanitarian activities are being conducted'. OCHA, 'Summary of HCT Donor Meeting', 2 November 2011, [ochaonline.un.org](http://ochaonline.un.org). See also OCHA, 'Summary of HCT Donor Meeting', 13 October 2011, [ochaonline.un.org](http://ochaonline.un.org). This notes: 'The HCT [ie the UN Humanitarian Country Team] is of the view that new or expanded military intervention into famine areas will decrease the humanitarian community's ability to access people in urgent need of assistance and reduce the effectiveness of humanitarian response'. See also OCHA, 'Summary of HCT Donor Meeting', 27 September 2011, [ochaonline.un.org](http://ochaonline.un.org). The head of OCHA, Valerie Amos, has said that she is 'deeply concerned by the impact of the intensification of the conflict in Somalia, which threatens to increase internal displacement and may also reduce the ability of aid organisations to provide life-saving assistance to people coping with famine'. 'Emergency relief coordinator's key messages on Horn of Africa', 18 November 2011 (<http://reliefweb.int/node/460271>)
- 24 See, for example, Oxfam, 'International leaders should focus on saving lives and recovery', 18 November 2011 (<http://reliefweb.int/node/460031>)
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  - Obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to or within Somali
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